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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE 
STATE OF UTAH 
SHARON WINN, Natural Mother 
and Guardian of PERRIS ZAN 
WINN, Deceased , 
Plaintiff and Appellant, 
-vs-
THOMAS LEE STARKEY, JERRY 
SUE GIBB, FAMILY PRINTER, and 
STATE OF UTAH DEPARTMENT OF 
HIGHWAYS, 
Defendants and Respondents, 
Case No. 14239 
BRIEF OF DEFENDANTS-RESPONDENTS 
NATURE OF THE CASE 
This i s an action brought by the appellant and the natural mother of 
the minor decedent , Perris Zan Winn, for his claimed wrongful death alleged 
to have been caused when he was struck while crossing a street by two 
different motor veh i c l e s , one driven by defendant-respondent Thomas Lee 
Starkey and the other owned by defendant-respondent Family Printer and driven 
by defendant-respondent Jerry Sue Gibb . 
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DISPOSITION IN THE LOWER COURT 
Defendant, State of Utah Department of Highways, by stipulation of 
appellant was dismissed a s a defendant in the lower court and the lower court 
granted to the respondents Thomas Lee Starkey, Jerry Sue Gibb and Family 
Printer their motion to quash the service of process made upon them by 
appel lant . 
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL 
Respondents seek affirmance of the order of the lower court granting 
their motion to quash service of process made upon them. 
STATEMENT OF THE FACTS 
Respondents agree with the facts a s set forth in the brief of plaintiff-
appellant with the following exceptions and addi t ions . 
The death of Perris Zan Winn which gave r i se to this action occurred 
on November 16, 1972. The plaintiff-appellant filed the original complaint 
naming defendants-respondents Thomas Lee Starkey, Jerry Sue Gibb, Family 
Printer, and John Does I through V on November 15, 1973. 
The lower court ruled that respondents ' motion to quash service of 
process must be granted and cited a s authority Dennett v . Powers, 536 P.2d 
135 (1975), and Fibreboard Paper Products Corporation v . Dietr ich, 25 Utah 
2d 65 , 475 P.2d 1005 (1970). 
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ARGUMENT 
POINT I 
SERVICE OF PROCESS WAS NOT TIMELY MADE. 
Rule 4(b) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure reads as follows: 
" (b) TIME OF ISSUANCE AND SERVICE. If an action is 
commenced by the filing of a complaint, summons must 
i s sue thereon within three months from the date of such 
filing. The summons must be served within one year after 
the filing of the complaint or the action will be deemed 
d i smissed , provided that in any action brought against two 
or more defendants in which personal service has been 
obtained upon one of them within the year, the other or 
others may be served or appear at any time before t r i a l . " 
Clearly, the summons in this action did not i s sue within three months 
nor was it served withinoneyear after the filing of the original complaint. The 
question for determination then i s whether the amended complaint filed nearly 
a year later i s to be treated a s a new complaint for purposes of Rule 4(b). If 
the amended complaint does not relate back to the time of the filing of the 
original complaint, or if the original complaint i s reactivated to the time of 
the filing of the amended complaint, then both the i ssuance and service of 
process were timely and in accordance with Rule 4(b). On the other hand, 
if an amended complaint does relate back to the date of the filing of the original 
complaint, then the i ssuance of the summons on November 19, 1974, took place 
over a year after the filing and the service of process on April 14, 1975, came 
nearly a year and a half after the filing,or five months l a t e . That i s , a s of 
November 15, 1974, one year after the original complaint was filed, the action 
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should have been deemed dismissed and the service upon respondents should be 
treated a s a nullity having no legal effect. 
For the reasons and authority that follow, defendants-respondents urge this 
court to affirm the ruling of the lower court that according to the provisions of 
Rule 4(b), the original complaint in this action was deemed dismissed on 
November 15 , 1974, and that the subsequent service of process upon respondents 
was a nullity without any legal effect. 
The lower court relied in part upon the authority of Dennett v . Powers, 
cited above . In that c a s e , the complaint was filed on September 13 , 1972. On 
June 10, 1974, the defendants appeared special ly in court and moved that the 
complaint be dismissed on the grounds that the summons had not been timely 
served pursuant to the provisions of Rule 4(b). Following a failure of the 
plaintiffs in the ca se to show proof of service of process by October 2 1 , 1974, 
the lower court d ismissed the ac t ion . On appea l , the plaintiffs did not even 
contend that the summons was timely served but rather contended that the 
defendants had made a general appearance which gave the court jur isdict ion. 
In affirming the ruling of the lower court, the Supreme Court upheld both the 
special appearance of the defendants and the ruling that the failure of plaintiffs 
to comply with the provisions of Rule 4(b) with regard to the i ssuance and 
service of summons invalidated the summons and operated a s a dismissal 
of the complaint. 
In ruling that the complaint was dismissed because of a failure to 
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comply with the provisions of Rule 4(b), the Supreme Court in the Dennett 
case relied upon Fibreboard Paper Products Corporation v . Dietr ich, cited above. 
In that c a s e , the complaint was filed on February 2 1 , 1969. The summons was 
not received, however, by the sheriff until September 22, 1969, and was not 
served until September 24th of the same year . The defendants , for other 
r e a sons , refused to appear in court and a default judgment was entered. 
Later, however, a motion was made to quash the service on the defendants 
and to set a s ide the default judgment. The lower court granted that motion. 
The Supreme Court affirmed that ruling by holding very simply that because Rule 
4(b) requires that the summons be issued within three months of the filing of the 
complaint and because the summons in that c a se was not issued until some 
six months after the filing of the complaint, the summons was not timely i s sued . 
In neither of the c a s e s just cited and which were relied upon by the 
lower court was there an amended complaint in i s s u e . These two c a s e s , 
therefore, simply stand as authority that Rule 4(b) requires that a summons 
must be issued within three months from the filing of the complaint and 
served within one year of the filing of the complaint. If Rule 4(b) is not 
complied with in these two par t iculars , the complaint i s deemed d ismissed . 
The question then becomes whether the three-month period and the 
one-year period are to be measured from the filing of the original complaint 
or whether they are to be measured from the filing of the amended complaint. 
The pertinent provision of the Utah Code dealing with amendments to pleadings 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
i s Rule 15 of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure. Rule 15(a) merely se ts out 
the conditions under which an amendment to a pleading i s a l lowed. Rule 15(c) 
reads as follows: 
" (c) RELATION BACK OF AMENDMENTS. Whenever the claim 
or defense asser ted in the amended pleading arose out of the 
conduct , t ransact ion, or occurrence set forth or attempted 
to be set forth in the original pleading, the amendment re la tes 
back to the date of the original p leading." 
Prior to the adoption of the 1953 Code , Rule 15(a) had a counterpart 
in the former Section 104-14-3 and 104-14-4 . Rule 15(c) had no counterpart 
in the former law but was newly adopted in the 1953 Code . The rule verbalized 
in Rule 15(c) was developed in ca se law by the Utah Supreme Court prior to 
the adoption of Rule 15(c) a s an interpretation of the predecessors to Rule 
15(a). The question of whether an amended complaint re la tes back to the 
date of the filing of the original complaint or whether it i s given the date upon 
which it is filed is deal t with in Peterson v . Union Pacific Railroad, 79 Utah 
213, 8 P.2d 627, (1932). In that c a s e , the original complaint was timely 
filed but an amended complaint which the court found to be based upon the 
same facts and the same cause of action was filed after the running of the 
s tatute of l imi ta t ions . The ques t ion , therefore, was whether the statute of 
l imitations was to be measured with regard to the filing of the original 
complaint or with regard to the filing of the amended complaint. If the amended 
complaint did not relate back to the original complaint, then clearly the s tatute 
of l imitations had run and the action would have to be d i smissed . The court 
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said with regard to this question: 
"Where the amendment merely expands or amplifies what is 
alleged in the original complaint . . . in support of the cause 
of action it is property allowed; and relates back to the com-
mencement of the action." 
The Peterson case makes clear that the amended complaint is to relate back to the 
filing of the original complaint. Considerations of fairness to the plaintiffs with 
regard to the statute of limitations makes this a sensible rule. After the defendant 
has been put on notice by the filing of the original complaint within the period 
allowed by the statute of limitations and summons has been timely served upon 
the defendants within the time allowed by Rule 4(b), the policy of the statute 
of limitations should not necessitate the dismissal of the original complaint 
simply because an amendment was made after the point at which the statute of 
limitations would have run. 
Should the relation back of the amended complaint be any different for 
the policy of Rule 4(b)? Many of the same grounds for the adoption of limitation 
of action statutes apply in the statute requiring service of process within a 
given time. If the rule regarding the relation back of amended complaints is 
to be different for purposes of Rule 4(b), a plaintiff would be able to file a 
complaint, fail to timely issue or serve process thereon, and then one year 
later, five years later, or even twenty or fifty years later, amend the complaint j 
and thereafter issue and serve summons upon the amended complaint. It is clear ' 
that this is the very thing that was sought to be avoided by the framers of Rule 4(b). 
I 
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That i s , after the original complaint i s filed, the summons i s then to be put 
in the hands of a proper person for service within three months and must be 
served on one of the part ies within one year . If this intention can be circumvented 
by the simple expedient of filing an amended complaint at any t ime, with process 
then being timely issued and served on the amended complaint, and regardless 
of what was done to i s sue or serve process after the filing of the original 
complaint, then Rule 4(b) simply c e a s e s to have any meaning. 
This court is referred in appel lan t ' s brief to the case of Askwith v . 
El l i s , et a l , 85 Utah 103, 38 P.2d 757 (1934), which was a c a s e on very 
similar facts but heard before the adoption of the present Rule 4(b) which 
differs in one important way from i ts predecessor . The statute at the time of 
the Askwith c a s e , R .S . Utah 1933, 104-5 -5 , read a s follows: 
"If an action is commenced by the filing of a complaint with 
the clerk, summons must i s sue thereon within three months 
from the date of filing. If a summons is returned without 
being served upon any or al l of the defendants , another summons 
may be issued and served at any time within one year after the 
filing of the complaint ." 
As can be s een , the former s ta tute does not go on to s ta te a s does present 
Rule 4(b) that if service i s not timely made, the action is deemed d i smissed . 
In Askwith, the original complaint was filed on May 1, 1922. No summons 
was i ssued or served upon this complaint. An amended complaint was then filed 
on November 24, 1931, and service of summons was made shortly thereafter. 
Fi rs t , the court considered whether the action had been dismissed because of 
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the failure to serve summons upon the original complaint. Since Section 104-5-5 
contained no express provision whereby the complaint was deemed dismissed 
upon failure of process to be served within one year (and as is expressly stated 
in present Rule 4(b)), the court held that the action was still pending at the time 
of the filing of the amended complaint. With regard to that question, the court 
said: 
"There is no provision in the statute by which an action 
ceases to exist; by which an action terminates, ends, is 
dismissed, automatically dies, or ceases to be pending, 
because not speedily and vigorously prosecuted, or 
because no summons has been issued or served. It may 
well be that such a rule would be advisable, salutary, 
and just, but it is the duty of the legislature and not of 
the courts to make such a law.1' 
Of course, the legislature did in Rule 4(b) make such a law. If summons is 
not served within one year following the filing of the original complaint, 
the law now is that the action is deemed dismissed. 
On the subject matter of the relation back of the amended complaint to 
the original complaint and the effect of the failure of service of process, the 
court in Askwith said: 
"The time for pleading not having expired, the cause of 
action being the same, and being filed before service of 
summons and copy served on defendants, it seems clear 
that the complaint of 1931 was not spurious, but was 
properly filed as an amended complaint. The defendants 
were not yet before the court. Had they appeared specially 
with a motion to quash service of summons because not made 
within the year from the time the action was commenced, 
such motion might have been good. It may also be that 
defendants could have ignored the service of summons on 
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the grounds that the return showed on i t s face that it was a 
nullity and coult not ves t the court with jurisdiction of 
defendants . " _ , 
The difference in the Askwith ca se and the case at hand is that in Askwith 
the defendants appeared generally and submitted themselves to the jurisdiction 
of the court . In the c a s e at hand, defendants-respondents appeared special ly 
with a motion to quash the service because not timely made. The i s sue in 
Askwith w a s , of course , whether the amended complaint related back to the 
date of the filing of the original complaint. The court found that i t d id, and 
that the original complaint was st i l l pending. Even before the adoption of 
the new Rule 4(b), the court reasoned that a motion to quash service of summons 
would have been proper. 
The added provision in Rule 4(b) with regard to d ismissa l of the original 
complaint not only strengthens the reasoning of the court from Askwith and a s 
quoted above , but it compels the conclusion that service after the year has 
passed i s a null i ty. 
Appellant in her brief refers the court to State Bank of Sevier v . American 
Smith and Plast ic C o . , 80 Utah 215, 10 P.2d 1065 (1932). That case deal t with 
the problem of an answer being filed a couple of days la te and this court said 
it was not error to allow the answer to be filed a few days l a t e . That case is 
plainly not applicable to the case at hand. The validity of the initial pleadings 
i s not in i s sue here . 
The appellant a l so refers to Rule 4(h), Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, 
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which reads: 
" (h) AMENDMENT. At any time in its discretion and upon 
such terms as it deems just, the court may allow any process 
or proof of service thereof to be amended, unless it clearly 
appears that material prejudice would result to the substantial 
rights of the party against whom the process issued." 
Rule 4(h) is not a tool for the circumvention of Rule 4(b). Its purpose is to allow 
an amendment where inadvertent errors have been made in filling out the forms. 
This is not such a case . The date on the return in this case is the true date 
on which it was served and clear evidence of its invalidity. Rule 4(h) is the same 
as Federal Rules of Civil Procedure Rule 4(h). Professor Moore points out what 
types of amendments the rule was meant to allow: 
"Distinction may therefore be made between process issued 
in flagrant disregard of federal requirements, and process 
which though generally issued in conformity with federal 
requirements, through oversight does not fully comply with 
these requirements. Thus in instances where Rule 4(a) and 
4(b) clearly require original process to be issued and signed 
by the clerk and be under the seal of the court, original 
process issued by the plaintiff or his attorney may be void, 
and not curable by amendment, even if state law would 
sanction such process." 2 Moore's Federal Practice, 1295.51 
When the summons was served it was a nullity and the subsequent 
proof of service consequently also was invalid and therefore not amendable. 
Even if it is assumed arguendo that the process was valid, the date on which 
it is served is not one of the items that can conveniently be changed. To do so 
would be a flagrant violation of the rules of civil procedure as a whole. This 
court in Utah Sand & Gravel Products Corporation v. Tolbert, 16 Utah 2d 407, 
402 P.2d 703 (1965), in setting aside a lower court ruling allowing an amendment 
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to a summons changing the name of the court of jurisdiction said: 
"The law itself is a system of rules designed to safeguard 
rights and preserve order, and administration of jus t ice under 
i t must necessar i ly be carried on with some degree of order. 
This can be accomplished only by compliance with the rules 
es tabl ished for that purpose ." 
Any conceivable harshness or unfairness in the enforcement of Rule 4(b) 
might be eliminated by 78-12-40 U . C . A . 1953, which appellant refers to in 
her brief. It reads : 
"EFFECT OF FAILURE OF ACTION NOT ON MERITS. If any 
action is commenced within due time and a judgment thereon 
for the plaintiff i s reversed, or if the plaintiff fails in such 
action or upon a cause of action otherwise than upon the 
meri ts , and the time limited either by law or contract for 
commencing the same shall have expired, the plaintiff or 
if he dies and the cause of action survives , his represen ta t ives , 
may commence a new action within one year after the reversal 
or fa i lure ." 
If plaintiff, after filing a complaint, fails to comply with Rule 4(b) in 
issuing and serving process on that complaint, then plaintiff need only voluntarily 
d ismiss the complaint and file a new one to avoid any statute of l imitations 
problems. Clearly, if the new complaint i s filed within one year after the 
voluntary d ismissa l of an earlier timely filed complaint or within one year of 
a complaint "deemed dismissed" because of non-compliance with the service of 
process requirements of Rule 4(b), then the new complaint would be timely filed 
because of 78-12-40 U . C . A . 1953. 
CONCLUSION 
Respondents submit that plaint iff-appellant 's amended complaint re la tes 
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back to the date of the filing of the original complaint; that the i ssuance 
and service of process were not made until well past the dates required by 
the provision of Rule 4(b) Utah Rules of Civil Procedure; that therefore the 
process served upon defendants-respondents was invalid and incapable of 
bringing them within the jurisdiction of the court and that the ruling of the 
Distr ict Court granting respondents ' motion to quash service was proper and 
should be affirmed by this court . 
Respectfully submitted, 
STRONG & HANNI 
By DAVID K. WINDER 
604 Boston Building 
Salt Lake Ci ty , Utah 84111 
Attorneys for Defendants-Respondents 
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